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The political economy of European federalism 
Section 1  Introduction 
The unlucky Draft Treaty presenting a Constitution for Europe, first exposed in 
October 2002, then adopted by the plenary session of the European Convention on 13 
June 2003 is a further contribution to the fifty year old ongoing debate about the 
institutional framework of the European «Union». Indeed, as soon as the 1950s, the 
debate was launched by clear statements about the necessity to develop a federal-like 
European Union. For instance, Jean Monnet explicitly stipulated that the first 
supranational integrated community should be a foundation stone and a first step 
towards a «federation». The same objective was also referred to several times by 
Maurice Schuman when exposing his plan in May 1950. However, after so many 
intergovernmental conferences and despite an impressive literature has been devoted 
to the question, the effective constitutional status of the European Union remains 
uneasy to define. Europe «has charted its own brand of constitutional federalism» 
(Weiler, 1999, p. 17), a model that admittedly «does not correspond to the theorist’s 
model for political federalism» (Buchanan, 1996: 253). Accordingly, the «federalist 
nature [of the Union] has yet to be established» (Murkens, 2002, p. 1). In other words, 
question remains: What does the European model of federalism consist in? Following 
the methodology put forward by Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), this article proposes a 
contribution to this debate through a political economy analysis of the way 
prerogatives are assigned between the different institutional levels in Europe. 
Our argumentation develops within the theoretical framework of the principal-
agent relationship. The specific problem of European integration can be analysed from 
the normative perspective of the design of an optimal constitutional agency contract. 
In this article, we rather adopt a positive perspective. Thus, we refer to a simple but 
general model of federalism to describe the agency relationships that unite the 
different actors who participate in the agency constitutional contracts and the tasks 
that are delegated or assigned to these actors. More precisely, we assume that the 
citizens are in the situation of the principals and delegate tasks to several agents 
(national, infra- and supra-national institutions). Two forms of federalism can then be 3
distinguished. First, in a confederate framework the member states are the principals 
and they delegate a very limited number of tasks to the central institutions; the 
assignment of prerogatives rests on bargaining. Second, a federation characterises a 
constitutional assignment of prerogatives in which the central institutions are in the 
position of the principals and the member states are their agents. 
When applied to the European situation, this framework allows us to show that the 
assignment of prerogatives between the different institutional levels in Europe is a mix 
between a confederation (decentralised federalism) and (centralised) federalism. This 
argument differs from the two usual statements about European federalism. On the 
one hand, some observe that «Europe is closer to the confederal than it is to the 
federal» model (Weiler, 1999: 1). On the other hand, many consider that Europe has 
evolved from a decentralised to a centralised federalism (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2002). 
Truly, the Europe Union is more centralised today that it was a few years ago. 
Furthermore, it is also obvious that, to use the words of Piris, legal adviser of the 
Council of the European Union and of the intergovernmental conferences which 
negotiated and adopted the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, the European 
integration process «has not followed any pre-established Cartesian model» (2002, p. 
43). On the contrary, it has been guided by pragmatism, the pressures of (both national 
and international) interest groups and constrained by political agendas. However, the 
European integration process nonetheless appears to be quite consistent: between 1950 
and 2000, the European institutions have always presented, at the same time, federal 
features and characteristics of a confederation. This is the argument we defend in this 
article. 
From this perspective, our purpose is not simply to show that a process of 
centralisation indeed took place. We rather stress that, within this process, from the 
1950s until the end of the 20th century, the European institutional structure has always 
been characterised by ambiguity, always hesitating between a confederation and a 
federation. To illuminate these hesitations we utilise the landmark cases – Van Gend 
en Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L – to distinguish two periods between 1950 and 2000
1.
This helps us to show that before these judgements, the European Union is mainly a 
 
1 From this perspective, our argument is different from that of Paul Taylor (1975) who argues that the 
period from 1949 to 1955 corresponds to the federal phase ; from 1955 to1969, the Neofunctional phase 
and after 1969, the confederal phase. 4
confederation but it already contains elements of a federation. This is discussed in 
section 2. Then, in section 3, we show that the institutional structure of the Union 
evolves towards a more centralised federalism but still shows lasting elements of a 
confederation. Section 4 summarizes our argument and provides concluding remarks. 
Section 2  A mostly confederate system, nevertheless hybrid (1950-1962) 
Political entrepreneurs soon intend like Jean Monnet soon intend to gather the 
European nation states into a supranational and federal entity. However, they know 
perfectly well that the not so distant conflict and the «age-old opposition of France 
and Germany» (Schuman, 1950) are crucial obstacles making the immediate 
achievement of this objective impossible. It is then admitted that «Europe will not be 
made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity» (Schuman, 1950). Furthermore, 
many are opposed to the creation of a European federation. They rather prefer the 
building of a decentralised confederation in which the member states would keep the 
European institutions under their control. For these reasons, the attempts made to find 
a politically acceptable road towards integration result in a compromise which breeds 
a hybrid system. Neither a confederation nor a federation, the European institutions of 
that time display characteristics of a confederacy (2.1) as well as non negligible 
features of a federation (2.2). 
2. 1 A confederation at work 
Europe is primarily conceived as a confederation. This is not only evidenced by the 
opinions expressed in the debates at that time but also illustrated by the nature of the 
agreement giving birth to the first European treaties founding the European Coal and 
Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community. Thus, the corresponding «European contract» is not designed by 
an autonomous and original constituent power. Certainly, it may be possible to 
interpret the ratification procedures of the different European treaties by the national 
legislatures as constituent acts. However, nothing indicates that ratification does 
amount to exercising a real constituent power. As a corollary, the different treaties are 
not rooted in decisions or choices directly made by the citizens of the European nation 5
states. On the contrary, citizens are absent (or only indirectly involved) in the process 
of integration that establishes the European institutions. For instance, the ECSC 
Treaty is explicitly concluded in the names of Heads of states. Nothing is thus said 
about the level of agency linking the states and their own citizens. The Treaties only 
formalise the level of agency contract that organises the interactions between the 
states and the European institutions. More precisely, the European institutional order 
that then results from these treaties can be described as an agency relationship which 
takes place between the member states – in the position of the principals – and the 
European supranational institutions – their agents. 
Furthermore, one must also note two elements that reveal more clearly that the 
nation states are the principals. First, they control the delegation of prerogatives. Thus, 
the European institutions form the framework in which negotiations, when needed, 
will take place: central institutions (here, the European Community) are granted with 
certain competences, the extent of which is determined through diplomatic bargaining 
during intergovernmental conferences mainly. This is a clear illustration of a 
confederation contract: prerogatives are not permanently assigned through a 
constitution to the higher institutional, in this case European, level. To the contrary, 
when member states prove to be inefficient in dealing with a specific problem, they 
bargain with each other in order to know which tasks will be delegated to the central 
institutions. Second, the tasks that are delegated to the European institutions remain 
limited. This is strikingly but clearly put forward by a 1957 decision of the European 
Court of Justice (joint cases 7/56 & 3-7/57, Dineke Algera et al. v. Common 
Assembly of the European Steel and Coal Community, 1957, E.C.R 69: 82). Advocate 
General Maurice Lagrange stresses that the ECSC treaty is «based upon delegation» 
from the member states to the European institutions. Lagrange then insists that the 
Treaty only allows a «limited [transfer of] authority» to the supranational institutions, 
only with «strictly defined purpose[s]» because sovereignty, or in technical terms 
principalship, remains in the hands of the member states. 
The early European institutional order undoubtedly possesses characteristics of a 
confederation. Nevertheless, the set of European Treaties does not provide a perfect 
example of the agency relationships of a confederation. 6
2. 2 A federation in gestation 
To illustrate the federal dimension of the European institutions, we emphasize two 
crucial elements: first, the limited role of bargaining in the decision-making 
procedures and in the assignment of prerogatives; and second the existence of 
regulations. 
2.2.1  Bargaining and constitutional assignment of prerogatives
The assignment of prerogatives between the different institutional levels, the central 
issue of federalism, is undoubtedly different in a confederation and in a federation. As 
it is well known, bargaining and negotiation prevail in the functioning of a 
confederation. At best, one may even argue that no collective decision is made and no 
task is attributed to the central institutions outside this process. Certainly, as a general 
rule, bargaining indeed played an important role in the assignment and reassignment 
of prerogatives among the national and supra-national levels in Europe. However, the 
functioning of the European institutions only partially follows the constraints of 
bargaining. 
Firstly, at the central European level, some decisions can be made directly by the 
agents of the member states, outside any bargaining framework. Some institutions are 
indeed granted with prerogatives that can be labelled «constitutional» since there are 
not likely to be controlled by the member states. For instance, the European Coal and 
Steel Community treaty (Article 8) establishes a High Authority whose prerogatives 
are almost those of a principal. As long as it behaves within the legal framework of 
the Treaty and according to the objectives assigned by the Treaty, the High Authority 
benefits from «a certain independence». This is stated by a preliminary ruling of the 
European Court of Justice in Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (Case 8-55) and stated again in Meroni & 
Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (Case 9-56). These judgements are significant for many reasons. First, one 
cannot but note the already important role of the Court: although in the position of an 
agent of the member states, it nonetheless makes a decision about the prerogatives of 
another agent. Obviously, if the member states are the principals, one agent would 
certainly have no right to delineate the prerogatives of other agents. Second, the Court 
claims that the High Authority has the right to choose its own agents and, moreover, 7
that this very capacity of the High Authority to act as a principal is not subject to the 
control of the member states: It depends on the legitimacy that the High Authority 
itself attributes to this delegation. In other words, even if the member states as the 
principals and «masters of the covenant» retain formal authority, there are instances 
when real authority lies in the hands of their agents.
Secondly, even if they continue to play a role, bargaining and negotiation are 
progressively replaced by a constitutional assignment of prerogatives. The European 
Union indeed evolves from a confederate international legal order to a more 
centralised – federal – constitutional order. This evolution implies a modification in 
the way the set of original treaties (ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM) are perceived or 
interpreted by the European institutions, among which the European Court of Justice. 
The latter soon considers as one of its responsibilities the task of providing an 
interpretation of the treaties, according to the «presumed intention of the authors» of 
the Treaties, as it is mentioned in Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique case, at the 
end of the 1950s. The need for interpretation is a non negligible thing. More important 
are the constitutional consequences that it implies. In effect, the insistence on the need 
for interpretation that is necessarily associated with judicial decision-making reveals 
the belief in the existence of «a body of law – a corpus iuris – which the lawgiver is 
presumed to intend should be complete and coherent» (Edwards, 1997, p. 317). The 
existence of this framework is assumed in 1956, when the Court argues that the treaty 
of Rome can be considered as the «charter of the Community» (Fédération 
Charbonnière de Belgique, op. cit.). This court case consistently connects the need for 
interpretation in judicial decision making and the necessity of a legal background or 
framework within which interpretation is possible. 
2.2.2  Regulations, community law and the role of the ECJ
The European institutions are not only «independent» enough to delineate the set of 
their own competencies but also to define some of those of the member states and to 
impose some choices on the principals. This capacity relates to the second federal 
feature that characterises the Treaty of Rome, namely the role of regulations. Article 
189 of the Treaty of Rome acknowledges the capacity of the European institutions to 
provide specific rules that are «European rules» and can thus be considered as the first 
elements of the Community law. 8
Article 189 corresponds to a federal conception of rules; a conception in which 
rules are pure (supra-national) public goods as in a federation, rather than as local 
(national) public goods as it is in a confederation. This implies that the European 
Community, even if viewed as a confederation, is also set as a federation. 
Interestingly, the meaning of regulations was particularly rapidly – as soon as 1956 – 
understood and acknowledged by the Court of Justice (see Lagrange in Fédération 
Charbonnière de Belgique, op. cit.). 
Now, the existence of a Community law – laws and legal rules that are not only 
common to the member states but produced by the European institutions themselves – 
implies that there are two levels of rules, national and supranational. This raises the 
question of the way these two levels articulate with each other. Is there a hierarchy 
between national and supranational rules? Are they substitutable or complementary? 
These are the questions to which the Court provides answers in 1960. In the not often 
quoted Humblet v. Belgium case (case 6/60, E.C.R., 559: 569), the Court refers to 
what was then Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty to argue that member states are obliged 
to withdraw decisions that are «contrary to Community law» and that the latter 
directly applies in the member states as soon as they have ratified the Treaty. The 
corollary to this statement is that there is a hierarchy between the Community law and 
national law, the former having precedence over the latter. 
Accordingly, if there exist legal rules viewed as pure public goods and because of 
the possible conflicts that can arise between national and supra-national rules, the 
logical and necessary consequence is that these rules have to be controlled at the 
highest institutional level, even at the cost of possibly as much centralization as in a 
unitary framework. This is consistent with the creation and existence and even 
functioning of a European Court of Justice; in other words, the creation of the Court of 
Justice is significant of the federal dimension of the European institutions. One may 
argue that a Supreme Court is consistent with a confederate framework to the extent 
that it remains an agent to which the sovereign member states, acting as confederate 
principals, explicitly delegate some limited and defined tasks. However, in Europe, 
the Court was created as a means to check the other components of government: in 
particular, to verify that the secondary law – legislation proposed by the Commission 
and enacted by Council and Parliament – fits the frame of the primary law. This does 
not correspond to a confederation, a regime in which the behaviours of the central 9
institutions are supposedly controlled by the member states through bargaining and 
veto power. Thus, to rely on a Court as a means to control the agents refers to a 
federal structure rather than to a confederation. This is no surprise if the Court itself 
interprets its role as that of the supreme court of a federal system (see Lagrange in 
Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique, op. cit.). 
Obviously, the way prerogatives are assigned to the national and supra-national 
levels does not receive the same interpretation in a confederation and in a federation. 
That two possible frameworks exist and that the Court considers itself as part of a 
federation indicates that a «federal turn» will be taken, though it will not be complete. 
Section 3  The road to partial federalisation (1963-2000) 
The road to federalism is signposted by judgments of the ECJ. These judgments 
expand the prerogatives of the European institutions, including the Court itself (as 
shown by the analysis of the preliminary reference article, for instance; see Voigt, 
2003; Tridimas and Tridimas, 2004). The decisions made by the Court also contribute 
to progressively change the institutional structure of the European Union, turning it 
from a confederation into a more centralised and federal regime. This is what has been 
stressed, for instance, by Lenaerts who writes that the Court produced a «series of 
rulings that helped turn a public-international-law construction into a truly novel legal 
order containing the essence of a federal system» (1992, 94). But, and this is an 
interesting feature of the European «model» of federalism, the Court only proceeds to 
a partial federalisation of the European confederation, which proves to be resilient. 
3. 1 Ongoing federalisation 
The premises of the transformation of the European community from a confederate to 
a federation can be associated with decisions made by the Court in the second half of 
the 1950s. However, the arguments developed by the ECJ were not fully 
«understandable» at that time and the related changes the court cases implied remain 
implicit. The reason is that the role of the Court was interpreted within the context of 
an international legal order. The «federal turn» could be perceptible only within the 
legal framework of a federation. This is the reason why the move towards a federation 
is usually associated with the preliminary decisions made in landmark judgements that 10 
are Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Berlastingen (case 26/62, 
1963, E.C.R 1) and Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Case 6/64, 1964, E.C.R. 585). These 
really important cases transform the existing legal order, turning it from an 
international to a constitutional legal order. As a consequence, the prerogatives of the 
European institutions are constitutionalised but they also expand. 
3.1.1  Towards a constitutional assignment of prerogatives
The role of bargaining in the assignment and re-assignment of prerogatives was 
already only partial in the 1950s. As we have seen before, some provisions granted 
once-and-for-all prerogatives to the European institutions. The latter could then make 
decisions outside the procedure of intergovernmental negotiations. A more important 
change can be associated with Van Gend & Loos. The court decision made in Van 
Gend & Loos rests on the argument that the Treaty of Rome «is more than an 
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting States». 
Would the Treaty have only created mutual obligations between the contracting 
States, it would only have been an international treaty and an agreement between the 
members of a confederation. In arguing that it is more than that, the Court insists that 
the European Union is not an international legal order or a confederation. It belongs to 
a legal category quite different from the one – international public law – initially 
conceived during the early stages of the Community. Europe is now considered, at 
least by the Court, as a constitutional legal order. 
Initiated in the early sixties, the process eventually leads to the definition of the 
treaties as the European «basic constitutional charter» (case 294/83, Parti écologiste 
«Les Verts» v. European Parliament, 1986, E.C.R. 1339: 1365). To consider that the 
Treaties do not only consist in a legal background providing references for judicial 
interpretation but also form the European constitution means that the assignment of 
prerogatives should no longer result from interstate bargaining. The 1986 
Luxembourg compromise completes the process. Decision making is at that time 
based on the rule of unanimity. The Luxembourg compromise brings about incentives 
to shift from bargain federalism to a more centralized vision. 11 
3.1.2  The expanding attributes of a federation
From the perspective of economic theory, the argumentation developed by the Court 
in the Van Gend en Loos case obviously consists in re-stating that European rules are 
pure public goods. It also plays an important role in confirming the hierarchy between 
national laws and Community obligations. In effect, with Van Gend en Loos, the 
Court argues that the legal order is common to all the member states of the Union and 
therefore cannot be restricted of the limits of the nation states. Thus, the «municipal 
law» common to the member states of the Union – the Community law – must apply 
directly and uniformly within each country member of the Union. Furthermore, it 
means that national legislatures and judiciaries are only part of this legal order. 
As a corollary, this claim also results in a change in the agency relationship 
underlying the European institutions as well as a change in the respective prerogatives 
assigned to the different parties to the contract. From the perspective of international 
law a supranational government remains subordinated to its creators; the reverse 
occurs in a constitutional order where the constituent units subordinate themselves to 
their creation. This is explicitly put forward by the Court in another landmark case of 
the 1960s, namely Costa v. E.N.E.L. In this case, the ECJ clearly establishes the 
institutions of the European Union – among which the Court itself – in the position of 
a principal. The European Court of Justice does not only establish itself in the position 
of the principal but also assumes the responsibilities of its new function. 
This evolution is all the more visible that it implies a decrease in the prerogatives 
of the original principals, the member states. One example is given by the seemingly 
disappearance of the principle of enumerated powers (Weiler, 1991). As is 
unambiguously put in a decision of the ECJ in 1967, «When the member states 
conferred powers on the community institutions, they agreed to a corresponding 
limitations in their sovereign rights» (Judgment of the Court of 13 December 1967, 
Firma Max Neumann v Hauptzollamt Hof/Saale; Reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Bundesfinanzhof – Germany; Case 17-67). Another example is provided by the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure in the Amsterdam treaty. This procedure is 
viewed as a way to check and balance the power of the Commission and Parliament 
and to encourage competition between them. It also implies a shift of power from the 
member states to the European level, thereby increasing the federal centralisation of 
the Union. 12 
Thus, as a result from this evolution, the respective role of the member states and 
the upper, supra-national, level of government institutions change. The European 
institutions acquire the position of the principal of the member states, their agents. 
There nevertheless remain some confederate features. Indeed, the move towards a 
federation is only partial. 
3. 2 Some lasting attributes of a confederation 
The implementation of the principle of subsidiarity (as introduced by the Maastricht 
treaty (Article 3B) and specified by the treaty of Amsterdam (Article 5)) can be 
interpreted from the perspective of the existence of lasting attributes of a 
confederation. Thus, even if the European institution structure becomes more and 
more federal and centralised, the constitutional framework developed in the European 
Union still largely includes elements of a confederation. The European Court of 
Justice contributes to reinforce the hybrid aspect of the European institutional 
structure. Indeed, the «judicial activism» of the Court only partially modifies the 
agency relationship, by adding a second source of principalship in the Union, namely 
the citizens. A complete shift from a confederation to a federation would have 
required to straightforwardly replace the principalship of the member states vis-à-vis 
the Union by that of the European citizens. This partial transformation has its origin in 
the Humblet and, above all, in the Van Gend en Loos cases. The Court thus states that 
the Community is «a new legal order of international law […] the subjects of which 
comprise not only the Member States, but also their nationals». 
As a consequence, both confederate and federate features coexist in the judicial 
landscape. Member states are the primary agents of the citizens when subsidiarity 
prevails and is implemented (when member states demonstrate that they can better 
achieve certain goals), whereas they are the secondary agents of the European level 
when Court decisions emphasize the duty of member states vis-à-vis European 
decisions. An example of it is the 1991 Francovich case (Andrea Francovich and 
Danila Bonifaci and others v. Italian Republic, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, E.C.R 
1991) by which individuals can claim compensation after suffering damage resulting 
from a lack of implementation of a European directive at the state level. In the first 
case, the confederate setting prevails while the second case promotes centralized 
federalism. 13 
Section 4  Conclusion 
Though citizens have been formally part of the «European covenant» since the Van 
Gend en Loos case, the architecture of principal-agent relationships in the Union 
remains unclear. On the one hand, the activism of the Court often tends to foster the 
secondary principalship of the Union: In this acceptation, citizens are members of the 
Union before being members of a state. This is the federal side. On the other hand, 
subsidiarity as it is defined in the treaties still provides a rationale for member states to 
claim secondary principalship over the Union. Here, citizens are members of a state 
before being members of the Union. This is the confederal side. The co-existence of 
two possible agency settings obviously has important consequences on the assignment 
of rights between the states and the supranational power. It also contributes to keep 
the institutional form of the European Union as a hybrid (con)federation. 
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